Organizational governance

Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein

    Research output: Working paperResearch

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    Abstract

    This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationFrederksberg
    PublisherCenter for Strategic Management and Globalization
    Number of pages74
    ISBN (Print)9788791815126
    Publication statusPublished - Oct 2007
    SeriesSMG Working Paper
    Number11/2007

    Keywords

    • Rational choice
    • Organizational economics
    • Governance structures
    • Governance mechanisms

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