Optimal Standards of Negligence When One Party Is Uninformed of the Standards

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

    Original languageEnglish
    JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
    Volume26
    Issue number3
    Pages (from-to)592-608
    Number of pages17
    ISSN8756-6222
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2010

    Cite this

    @article{82b7fb10800911de8153000ea68e967b,
    title = "Optimal Standards of Negligence When One Party Is Uninformed of the Standards",
    keywords = "Rets{\o}konomi, Erstatningsret, Erhvervsansvar",
    author = "Henrik Lando",
    note = "First published online: July 1, 2009",
    year = "2010",
    doi = "10.1093/jleo/ewp014",
    language = "English",
    volume = "26",
    pages = "592--608",
    journal = "Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization",
    issn = "8756-6222",
    publisher = "Oxford University Press",
    number = "3",

    }

    Optimal Standards of Negligence When One Party Is Uninformed of the Standards. / Lando, Henrik.

    In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2010, p. 592-608.

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Optimal Standards of Negligence When One Party Is Uninformed of the Standards

    AU - Lando, Henrik

    N1 - First published online: July 1, 2009

    PY - 2010

    Y1 - 2010

    KW - Retsøkonomi

    KW - Erstatningsret

    KW - Erhvervsansvar

    U2 - 10.1093/jleo/ewp014

    DO - 10.1093/jleo/ewp014

    M3 - Journal article

    VL - 26

    SP - 592

    EP - 608

    JO - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

    JF - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

    SN - 8756-6222

    IS - 3

    ER -