One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence

Thomas Poulsen, Johan E. Eklund

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication date2010
    Number of pages28
    Publication statusPublished - 2010
    EventThe 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010 - Rome, Italy
    Duration: 19 May 201022 May 2010
    Conference number: 10
    http://www.euram2010.org/r/default.asp?iId=EGGMKK

    Conference

    ConferenceThe 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010
    Number10
    CountryItaly
    CityRome
    Period19/05/201022/05/2010
    OtherBack to the Future
    Internet address

    Cite this

    Poulsen, T., & Eklund, J. E. (2010). One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence. Paper presented at The 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010, Rome, Italy.
    Poulsen, Thomas ; Eklund, Johan E. / One Share-One Vote : New Empirical Evidence. Paper presented at The 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010, Rome, Italy.28 p.
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    title = "One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence",
    abstract = "Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.",
    keywords = "Ownership structure, One share-one vote, Proportionality, Performance, Entrenchment",
    author = "Thomas Poulsen and Eklund, {Johan E.}",
    year = "2010",
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    url = "http://www.euram2010.org/r/default.asp?iId=EGGMKK",

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    Poulsen, T & Eklund, JE 2010, 'One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence' Paper presented at, Rome, Italy, 19/05/2010 - 22/05/2010, .

    One Share-One Vote : New Empirical Evidence. / Poulsen, Thomas; Eklund, Johan E.

    2010. Paper presented at The 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010, Rome, Italy.

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

    TY - CONF

    T1 - One Share-One Vote

    T2 - New Empirical Evidence

    AU - Poulsen, Thomas

    AU - Eklund, Johan E.

    PY - 2010

    Y1 - 2010

    N2 - Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.

    AB - Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.

    KW - Ownership structure

    KW - One share-one vote

    KW - Proportionality

    KW - Performance

    KW - Entrenchment

    M3 - Paper

    ER -

    Poulsen T, Eklund JE. One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence. 2010. Paper presented at The 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010, Rome, Italy.