On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries

Research output: Working paperResearch

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Abstract

Abstract:Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach ofcontract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy inCivil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specificperformance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany andFrance, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to beundertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We arguethat it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcementthat renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party,and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries)chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especiallyclear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actionshas been abandoned as a legal remedy.At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs providesan additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theoryof efficient breach, for damages and against specific performanceas the general remedy.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationKøbenhavn
Number of pages26
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Cite this

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title = "On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries",
abstract = "Abstract:Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach ofcontract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy inCivil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specificperformance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany andFrance, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to beundertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We arguethat it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcementthat renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party,and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries)chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especiallyclear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actionshas been abandoned as a legal remedy.At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs providesan additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theoryof efficient breach, for damages and against specific performanceas the general remedy.",
keywords = "rets{\o}konomi, kontrakter, aftaleret, kontraktteori, personret",
author = "Henrik Lando and Caspar Rose",
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On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries. / Lando, Henrik; Rose, Caspar.

København, 2003.

Research output: Working paperResearch

TY - UNPB

T1 - On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries

AU - Lando, Henrik

AU - Rose, Caspar

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - Abstract:Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach ofcontract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy inCivil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specificperformance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany andFrance, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to beundertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We arguethat it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcementthat renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party,and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries)chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especiallyclear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actionshas been abandoned as a legal remedy.At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs providesan additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theoryof efficient breach, for damages and against specific performanceas the general remedy.

AB - Abstract:Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach ofcontract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy inCivil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specificperformance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany andFrance, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to beundertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We arguethat it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcementthat renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party,and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries)chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especiallyclear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actionshas been abandoned as a legal remedy.At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs providesan additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theoryof efficient breach, for damages and against specific performanceas the general remedy.

KW - retsøkonomi

KW - kontrakter

KW - aftaleret

KW - kontraktteori

KW - personret

M3 - Working paper

BT - On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries

CY - København

ER -