On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs

Research output: Working paperResearch

Abstract

We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the literature on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of enforcement to the claimant.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationFrederiksberg
PublisherInstitut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School
Number of pages24
ISBN (Print)8790705440
Publication statusPublished - 2000
SeriesWorking Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School
Number2000-10
ISSN0903-0352

Cite this

Lando, H., & Rose, C. (2000). On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs. Frederiksberg: Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School. Working Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School, No. 2000-10
Lando, Henrik ; Rose, Caspar. / On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs. Frederiksberg : Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, 2000. (Working Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School; No. 2000-10).
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Lando, H & Rose, C 2000 'On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs' Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg.

On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs. / Lando, Henrik; Rose, Caspar.

Frederiksberg : Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, 2000.

Research output: Working paperResearch

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T1 - On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs

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N2 - We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the literature on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of enforcement to the claimant.

AB - We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the literature on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of enforcement to the claimant.

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KW - Retsøkonomi

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KW - Retshåndhævelse

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Lando H, Rose C. On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs. Frederiksberg: Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School. 2000.