On Broome’s Notion of Normativity

Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Abstract

As a part of John Broome’s stated aim to establish a clear distinction between rationality and normativity, Broome suggests a novel definition of normativity as a property term that applies to persons. Since this construal of normativity diverges significantly from most prominent renderings of the concept within contemporary philosophical discussions, it merits critical scrutiny. In response to Broome, I thus examine the technical advantage of Broome’s approach, while also indicating some drawbacks of Broome’s novel conceptualization of ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’.
Original languageEnglish
JournalAustralasian Philosophical Review
Volume4
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)373-378
Number of pages6
ISSN2474-0500
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Keywords

  • Normativity
  • Rationality
  • Reasons
  • John Broome

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