Abstract
This study examines how multiple blockholder structures affect family firm performance. Building on arguments from both principal–principal agency and familiness perspectives, we suggest that asymmetrical distribution of voting power among family and nonfamily blockholders hurts firm performance. Further, we suggest that the larger the number of blockholder types, the stronger the negative effect of voting-power asymmetry among family and nonfamily blockholders on firm performance. We provide empirical support for our hypotheses using a longitudinal sample of 413 French family firms over the 1992–2012 period.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 231-251 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| ISSN | 1042-2587 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2018 |
Keywords
- Blockholders
- Familiness
- Family business
- Principal-principal agency costs