Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games: Some (Im)Possibility Results

Peter H. Knudsen, Lars Peter Østerdal

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume41
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)763–774
ISSN0020-7276
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cooperative games
  • Manipulation
  • Merging
  • Splitting
  • Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule

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