TY - JOUR
T1 - Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games
T2 - Some (Im)Possibility Results
AU - Knudsen, Peter H.
AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.
AB - Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.
KW - Cooperative games
KW - Manipulation
KW - Merging
KW - Splitting
KW - Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule
KW - Cooperative games
KW - Manipulation
KW - Merging
KW - Splitting
KW - Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule
UR - https://sfx-45cbs.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/45cbs?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:azlist&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=954925407734&rft.object_portfolio_id=&svc.holdings=yes&svc.fulltext=yes
U2 - 10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7
DO - 10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7
M3 - Journal article
VL - 41
SP - 763
EP - 774
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
SN - 0020-7276
IS - 4
ER -