Match Rigging and the Career Concerns of Referees

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on career concerns and corruption by drawing on extensive information on the performance of referees and records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian football league. Unlike previous studies, we can analyse in detail the assignment of the referees to the most important matches, which is an important step in their career. Moreover, we can relate this choice to the performance of referees in previous matches and the evaluations they received in this context. We find that referees involved in match rigging were promoted to top games and that their evaluation was not negatively affected by their involvement in documented episodes of match rigging.
Original languageEnglish
JournalLabour Economics
Volume18
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)349-359
ISSN0927-5371
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2011

Keywords

  • Corruption
  • Career Concerns
  • Grading of Referees
  • Professional Sport Industry
  • Sequential Probit Model

Cite this

Severgnini, Battista ; Boeri, Tito. / Match Rigging and the Career Concerns of Referees. In: Labour Economics. 2011 ; Vol. 18, No. 3. pp. 349-359.
@article{32be29210ce44f1e89f99b08758e82fe,
title = "Match Rigging and the Career Concerns of Referees",
abstract = "This paper contributes to the literature on career concerns and corruption by drawing on extensive information on the performance of referees and records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian football league. Unlike previous studies, we can analyse in detail the assignment of the referees to the most important matches, which is an important step in their career. Moreover, we can relate this choice to the performance of referees in previous matches and the evaluations they received in this context. We find that referees involved in match rigging were promoted to top games and that their evaluation was not negatively affected by their involvement in documented episodes of match rigging.",
keywords = "Corruption, Career Concerns, Grading of Referees, Professional Sport Industry, Sequential Probit Model",
author = "Battista Severgnini and Tito Boeri",
year = "2011",
month = "6",
doi = "10.1016/j.labeco.2010.10.006",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "349--359",
journal = "Labour Economics",
issn = "0927-5371",
publisher = "Elsevier BV North-Holland",
number = "3",

}

Match Rigging and the Career Concerns of Referees. / Severgnini, Battista; Boeri, Tito.

In: Labour Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3, 06.2011, p. 349-359.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Match Rigging and the Career Concerns of Referees

AU - Severgnini, Battista

AU - Boeri, Tito

PY - 2011/6

Y1 - 2011/6

N2 - This paper contributes to the literature on career concerns and corruption by drawing on extensive information on the performance of referees and records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian football league. Unlike previous studies, we can analyse in detail the assignment of the referees to the most important matches, which is an important step in their career. Moreover, we can relate this choice to the performance of referees in previous matches and the evaluations they received in this context. We find that referees involved in match rigging were promoted to top games and that their evaluation was not negatively affected by their involvement in documented episodes of match rigging.

AB - This paper contributes to the literature on career concerns and corruption by drawing on extensive information on the performance of referees and records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian football league. Unlike previous studies, we can analyse in detail the assignment of the referees to the most important matches, which is an important step in their career. Moreover, we can relate this choice to the performance of referees in previous matches and the evaluations they received in this context. We find that referees involved in match rigging were promoted to top games and that their evaluation was not negatively affected by their involvement in documented episodes of match rigging.

KW - Corruption

KW - Career Concerns

KW - Grading of Referees

KW - Professional Sport Industry

KW - Sequential Probit Model

U2 - 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.10.006

DO - 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.10.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 18

SP - 349

EP - 359

JO - Labour Economics

JF - Labour Economics

SN - 0927-5371

IS - 3

ER -