Market Response to Inefficient Judiciary: Promoting Rule Compliance and Good Governance Practice

Aleksandra Gregoric; Katarina Zajc; Marko Simoneti

Market Response to Inefficient Judiciary: Promoting Rule Compliance and Good Governance Practice

Aleksandra Gregoric, Katarina Zajc, Marko Simoneti

University of Ljubljana

Research output: Working paper › Research

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Abstract

The paper re-examines the concerns on the rule-based governance in poor institutional environment. By relying on the theories and research vehicles of social psychology, we show that under certain conditions, the ‘law on books’ may still play role in governing market transactions, even though no formal enforcement applies. We furthermore expose the potential of the Corporate Governance Code as the ‘signaling device’ and provide arguments as to why this potential may be even stronger in an environment with relatively weak institutions in comparison to the developed market economies.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Frederiksberg
Publisher	Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School
Number of pages	30
Publication status	Published - 2007

Series	Working Paper / Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School
Number	9-2007

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Gregoric, Aleksandra ; Zajc, Katarina ; Simoneti, Marko. / Market Response to Inefficient Judiciary : Promoting Rule Compliance and Good Governance Practice. Frederiksberg : Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, 2007. (Working Paper / Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School; No. 9-2007).

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