Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans

Tim R. Adam, Valentin Burg, Tobias Scheinert, Daniel Streitz

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts (performance-sensitive debt [PSD]). Managers with biased views may issue PSD because they consider this form of debt to be mispriced. Our evidence shows that overconfident managers are more likely to issue rate-increasing PSD than regular debt. They choose PSD with steeper performance-pricing schedules than those chosen by rational managers. We reject the possibility that overconfident managers have (persistent) positive private information and use PSD for signaling. Finally, firms seem to benefit less from using PSD ex post if they are managed by overconfident rather than rational managers.
Original languageEnglish
JournalManagement Science
Volume66
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)352-375
Number of pages24
ISSN0025-1909
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

Bibliographical note

Published online: 21. May 2019

Keywords

  • Behavioral biases
  • Overconfidence
  • Performance-sensitive debt
  • Debt contracting
  • Syndicated loans

Cite this

Adam, Tim R. ; Burg, Valentin ; Scheinert, Tobias ; Streitz, Daniel. / Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design : The Case of Syndicated Loans. In: Management Science. 2020 ; Vol. 66, No. 1. pp. 352-375.
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Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design : The Case of Syndicated Loans. / Adam, Tim R.; Burg, Valentin; Scheinert, Tobias; Streitz, Daniel.

In: Management Science, Vol. 66, No. 1, 01.2020, p. 352-375.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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