Making and Breaking Property Rights

Coalitions, Veto Players, and the Institutional Foundation of Markets

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    This paper analyzes why some governments protect property rights while others do not. Although institutional constraints may affect government incentives to protect property rights, the paper emphasizes that different political institutions have dissimilar effects. Coalition institutions that make governments accountable to large groups in society are particularly important, whereas division of powers between veto players is hypothesized to have more ambiguous effects on property rights. Empirical analyses of panel data support the proposition that coalition institutions matter for property-rights protection, whereas veto-player institutions have no particular effect.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
    Volume171
    Issue number2
    Pages (from-to)238-262
    Number of pages25
    ISSN0932-4569
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015

    Cite this

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    Making and Breaking Property Rights : Coalitions, Veto Players, and the Institutional Foundation of Markets. / Justesen, Mogens Kamp.

    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 171, No. 2, 2015, p. 238-262.

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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