Lobbying Bureaucrats

Delegation and Influence Under Alternative Political Structures

Morten Bennedsen, Sven E. Feldmann

Research output: Working paperResearch

Abstract

This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policyoutcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision-makingauthority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to accountfor interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy and apply itto different institutional structures of government. The paper addresses the followingquestions: First, how does the decision to delegate change when the bureaucratic agentis subject to external influence? What cost does this influence impose on the legislativeprincipal? Finally, how susceptible are policy choices to bureaucratic lobbying underdifferent government structures? In answering these questions, the paper seeks to providea comparative theory of lobbying and to explain the different patterns of interestgroup activity across political systems.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationKøbenhavn
Number of pages43
ISBN (Electronic)x656409265
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Cite this

Bennedsen, Morten ; Feldmann, Sven E. / Lobbying Bureaucrats : Delegation and Influence Under Alternative Political Structures. København, 2004.
@techreport{54c0b210c02111db9769000ea68e967b,
title = "Lobbying Bureaucrats: Delegation and Influence Under Alternative Political Structures",
abstract = "This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policyoutcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision-makingauthority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to accountfor interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy and apply itto different institutional structures of government. The paper addresses the followingquestions: First, how does the decision to delegate change when the bureaucratic agentis subject to external influence? What cost does this influence impose on the legislativeprincipal? Finally, how susceptible are policy choices to bureaucratic lobbying underdifferent government structures? In answering these questions, the paper seeks to providea comparative theory of lobbying and to explain the different patterns of interestgroup activity across political systems.",
keywords = "Beslutningsteori, Uddelegering, Politiske beslutningsprocesser, Interesseorganisationer, Lobbyisme",
author = "Morten Bennedsen and Feldmann, {Sven E.}",
year = "2004",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

Lobbying Bureaucrats : Delegation and Influence Under Alternative Political Structures. / Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven E.

København, 2004.

Research output: Working paperResearch

TY - UNPB

T1 - Lobbying Bureaucrats

T2 - Delegation and Influence Under Alternative Political Structures

AU - Bennedsen, Morten

AU - Feldmann, Sven E.

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policyoutcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision-makingauthority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to accountfor interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy and apply itto different institutional structures of government. The paper addresses the followingquestions: First, how does the decision to delegate change when the bureaucratic agentis subject to external influence? What cost does this influence impose on the legislativeprincipal? Finally, how susceptible are policy choices to bureaucratic lobbying underdifferent government structures? In answering these questions, the paper seeks to providea comparative theory of lobbying and to explain the different patterns of interestgroup activity across political systems.

AB - This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policyoutcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision-makingauthority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to accountfor interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy and apply itto different institutional structures of government. The paper addresses the followingquestions: First, how does the decision to delegate change when the bureaucratic agentis subject to external influence? What cost does this influence impose on the legislativeprincipal? Finally, how susceptible are policy choices to bureaucratic lobbying underdifferent government structures? In answering these questions, the paper seeks to providea comparative theory of lobbying and to explain the different patterns of interestgroup activity across political systems.

KW - Beslutningsteori

KW - Uddelegering

KW - Politiske beslutningsprocesser

KW - Interesseorganisationer

KW - Lobbyisme

M3 - Working paper

BT - Lobbying Bureaucrats

CY - København

ER -