Judging under Political Pressure

An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court

Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gomez-Pomar , Veronica Grembi

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

In this article, we study the extent to which decisions by the Spanish Constitutional Court are explained by political variables. Our theory proposes that party alignment should play an important role in explaining the behavior of the Spanish constitutional judges, but with some limitations given the institutional constraints faced by the court. Therefore, we do not propose pure party alignment but a more sophisticated strategy approach based on the interaction between the advancement of ideological goals with the limitations imposed essentially by the civil law tradition of consensual courts. Using a unique data set of abstract review cases in 1980–2006, we conclude that the patterns of political influence in the Spanish Constitutional Court are complex and cannot be easily framed merely as the pure reflection of the attitudinal model and of left/right alignment.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Volume29
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)513-534
ISSN8756-6222
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

Cite this

@article{4eb687e79050488daf2fdf2c477090ae,
title = "Judging under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court",
abstract = "In this article, we study the extent to which decisions by the Spanish Constitutional Court are explained by political variables. Our theory proposes that party alignment should play an important role in explaining the behavior of the Spanish constitutional judges, but with some limitations given the institutional constraints faced by the court. Therefore, we do not propose pure party alignment but a more sophisticated strategy approach based on the interaction between the advancement of ideological goals with the limitations imposed essentially by the civil law tradition of consensual courts. Using a unique data set of abstract review cases in 1980–2006, we conclude that the patterns of political influence in the Spanish Constitutional Court are complex and cannot be easily framed merely as the pure reflection of the attitudinal model and of left/right alignment.",
author = "Nuno Garoupa and Fernando Gomez-Pomar and Veronica Grembi",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1093/jleo/ewr008",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "513--534",
journal = "Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization",
issn = "8756-6222",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "3",

}

Judging under Political Pressure : An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court. / Garoupa, Nuno ; Gomez-Pomar , Fernando ; Grembi, Veronica .

In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2013, p. 513-534.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Judging under Political Pressure

T2 - An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court

AU - Garoupa, Nuno

AU - Gomez-Pomar , Fernando

AU - Grembi, Veronica

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In this article, we study the extent to which decisions by the Spanish Constitutional Court are explained by political variables. Our theory proposes that party alignment should play an important role in explaining the behavior of the Spanish constitutional judges, but with some limitations given the institutional constraints faced by the court. Therefore, we do not propose pure party alignment but a more sophisticated strategy approach based on the interaction between the advancement of ideological goals with the limitations imposed essentially by the civil law tradition of consensual courts. Using a unique data set of abstract review cases in 1980–2006, we conclude that the patterns of political influence in the Spanish Constitutional Court are complex and cannot be easily framed merely as the pure reflection of the attitudinal model and of left/right alignment.

AB - In this article, we study the extent to which decisions by the Spanish Constitutional Court are explained by political variables. Our theory proposes that party alignment should play an important role in explaining the behavior of the Spanish constitutional judges, but with some limitations given the institutional constraints faced by the court. Therefore, we do not propose pure party alignment but a more sophisticated strategy approach based on the interaction between the advancement of ideological goals with the limitations imposed essentially by the civil law tradition of consensual courts. Using a unique data set of abstract review cases in 1980–2006, we conclude that the patterns of political influence in the Spanish Constitutional Court are complex and cannot be easily framed merely as the pure reflection of the attitudinal model and of left/right alignment.

U2 - 10.1093/jleo/ewr008

DO - 10.1093/jleo/ewr008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 513

EP - 534

JO - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

JF - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

SN - 8756-6222

IS - 3

ER -