Incentives for Quality over Time: The Case of Facebook Applications

Jörg Claussen, Tobias Kretschmer, Philip Mayrhofer

    Research output: Working paperResearch

    Abstract

    We study the market for applications on Facebook, the dominant platform for social networking and make use of a rule change by Facebook by which high-quality applications were rewarded with further opportunities to engage users. We find that the change led to quality being a more important driver of usage while sheer network size became less important. Further, we find that update frequency helps applications maintain higher usage, while generally usage of Facebook applications declines less rapidly with age.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationLondon
    PublisherThe London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE
    Number of pages29
    Publication statusPublished - 2012
    SeriesCEP Discussion Paper
    Number1133

    Keywords

    • Usage Intensity
    • Social Media
    • Platform Management
    • Two-sided Markets

    Cite this

    Claussen, J., Kretschmer, T., & Mayrhofer, P. (2012). Incentives for Quality over Time: The Case of Facebook Applications. The London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE. CEP Discussion Paper, No. 1133 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/abstract.asp?index=4022