Abstract
How do we inferentially unify separately acquired empirical information into a single comprehensive picture of the lives of persistent particulars? This paper argues that hidden in such inferences is a Fregean puzzle that can only be solved by individuating our demonstratives thoughts in terms of object-dependent Fregean Senses. I begin by characterizing some constraints on a non-skeptical account of our inferential unification of empirical information. I then go on to show that traditional Fregean views of Sense cannot explain the rationality of such inferences; the consequence of which would be widespread skepticism concerning fundamental aspects of our empirical worldview. I show how the theory of object-dependent Senses can account for the rationality of the puzzling inferences. Lastly, I consider the alternative that we abandon a Fregean explanation of the rationality of inferences. While not fully dismissing that option, I briefly raise, what I take to be, a daunting challenge that uniquely faces non-Fregean views of rational inference.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Inquiry |
Volume | 66 |
Issue number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 92-121 |
Number of pages | 30 |
ISSN | 0020-174X |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Published online 26 April 2019.Keywords
- Frege
- Frege's puzzle
- Sense
- Content
- Demonstrative thought
- Inference