Greener by Default

Cass R. Sunstein, Lucia A. Reisch

Research output: Working paperResearch

Abstract

Careful attention to choice architecture promises to open up new possibilities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions – possibilities that go well beyond, and that may supplement or complement, the standard tools of economic incentives, mandates, and bans. How, for example, do consumers choose between climate-friendly products or services and alternatives that are potentially damaging to the climate but less expensive? The answer may well depend on the default rule. Indeed, climate-friendly default rules may
well be a more effective tool for altering outcomes than large economic incentives. The underlying reasons include the power of suggestion; inertia and procrastination; and loss aversion. If well-chosen, climate-friendly defaults are likely to have large effects in reducing the economic and environmental harms associated with various products and activities. In deciding whether to establish climate-friendly defaults, choice architects (subject to legal constraints) should consider both consumer welfare and a wide range of other costs and benefits. Sometimes that assessment will argue strongly in favor of climate-friendly defaults, particularly when both economic and environmental considerations point in their direction.
Notably, surveys in the United States and Europe show that majorities in many nations are in favor of climate-friendly defaults.
Careful attention to choice architecture promises to open up new possibilities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions – possibilities that go well beyond, and that may supplement or complement, the standard tools of economic incentives, mandates, and bans. How, for example, do consumers choose between climate-friendly products or services and alternatives that are potentially damaging to the climate but less expensive? The answer may well depend on the default rule. Indeed, climate-friendly default rules may
well be a more effective tool for altering outcomes than large economic incentives. The underlying reasons include the power of suggestion; inertia and procrastination; and loss aversion. If well-chosen, climate-friendly defaults are likely to have large effects in reducing the economic and environmental harms associated with various products and activities. In deciding whether to establish climate-friendly defaults, choice architects (subject to legal constraints) should consider both consumer welfare and a wide range of other costs and benefits. Sometimes that assessment will argue strongly in favor of climate-friendly defaults, particularly when both economic and environmental considerations point in their direction.
Notably, surveys in the United States and Europe show that majorities in many nations are in favor of climate-friendly defaults.
LanguageEnglish
Place of PublicationCambridge, MA
PublisherHarvard Law School
Number of pages29
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2018
SeriesThe Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series
Number951

Cite this

Sunstein, C. R., & Reisch, L. A. (2018). Greener by Default. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School. The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, No. 951, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3097488
Sunstein, Cass R. ; Reisch, Lucia A./ Greener by Default. Cambridge, MA : Harvard Law School, 2018. (The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series; No. 951).
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Sunstein, CR & Reisch, LA 2018 'Greener by Default' Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3097488

Greener by Default. / Sunstein, Cass R.; Reisch, Lucia A.

Cambridge, MA : Harvard Law School, 2018.

Research output: Working paperResearch

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Sunstein CR, Reisch LA. Greener by Default. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School. 2018 Feb. Available from, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3097488