Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution

David Fortunato*, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review


We examine the extent to which governments consider the role of bicameral conflict resolution procedures in legislative agenda-setting. We argue that governments may use these institutions to promote policy change in the event of bicameral conflict, especially when facing uncertainty over bicameral policy preferences. We test our arguments using comprehensive original data on forty years of German legislation and find that bicameral conflict resolution committees play a more sophisticated role in governmental policy making than previously suspected.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPolitical Research Quarterly
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)938–951
Number of pages14
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2013
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Published online: 10. May 2013.


  • Bicameralism
  • Agenda-setting
  • Executive-legislative interactions
  • Legislative institutions
  • German politics

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