Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution

David Fortunato, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We examine the extent to which governments consider the role of bicameral conflict resolution procedures in legislative agenda-setting. We argue that governments may use these institutions to promote policy change in the event of bicameral conflict, especially when facing uncertainty over bicameral policy preferences. We test our arguments using comprehensive original data on forty years of German legislation and find that bicameral conflict resolution committees play a more sophisticated role in governmental policy making than previously suspected.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPolitical Research Quarterly
Number of pages14
ISSN1065-9129
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 May 2013
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Epub ahead of print. Published online: 10. May 2013

Keywords

  • Bicameralism
  • Agenda-setting
  • Executive-legislative interactions
  • Legislative institutions
  • German politics

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