Governing Through Guesstimates: Mock Precision in International Organisations

International organisations (IOs) collect and disseminate a wide array of statistics. In many cases, the phenomena these statistics seek to quantify defy precise measurement. Hard-to-measure statistics frequently represent ‘guesstimates’ rather than solid measures. Nonetheless, they are often presented as if they were perfectly reliable, precise estimates. What drives IOs to disseminate guesstimates and why are they frequently presented with seemingly excessive precision? To answer these questions, we adopt an ecological framework where IOs must pay attention to both internal and external audiences. The framework informs three mechanisms: Mock precise guesstimates are fuelled by how organisations seek to attract attention to their work, signal scientific competence, and consolidate their professional standing. Empirically, we evaluate these mechanisms in the context of statistics on (illicit) trade, employing a mixed methods approach that integrates elite interviews, expert surveys and a survey experiment. Our findings show how organisational and professional incentives lead to the use of mock precision. While the field we study is IOs, the underlying dynamics are of broader applicability. Not least, they raise questions about mock precision as a (un)scientific practice also commonly used by academic researchers in international political economy (IPE), economics and the wider social sciences.