Fishy Business

Multijurisdictional Treatment of a Horizontal Merger in Salmon Farming

Peter Møllgaard

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Recent decentralisation of EU competition policy led observers to fear that competition authorities in different member states would implement rules differently. This case study shows that such concern is real. A 2006 merger was notified to competition authorities in multiple jurisdictions. Despite a unique consensus on economic modelling and facts, authorities reached different conclusions regarding the long-run effects of the merger. Most authorities cleared the merger unconditionally but one made clearance conditional on divestitures. Behind the different treatment lie either different objectives or different theories of competitive harm. Both explanations are troubling since the authorities could have used the European Commission as a coordinating device.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Competition Journal
Volume6
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)677-688
Number of pages11
ISSN1744-1056
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2010

Keywords

  • Assessment of Remedies
  • Merger
  • Cournot Model

Cite this

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Fishy Business : Multijurisdictional Treatment of a Horizontal Merger in Salmon Farming. / Møllgaard, Peter.

In: European Competition Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, 12.2010, p. 677-688.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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