Exploring the Boomerang Effect: The Role of Core Technologies and Uncertainty in Explaining the Use of the Grant-Back Clause in Technology Licensing

Keld Laursen, M. Isabella Leone, Solon Moreira, Toke Reichstein

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    Licensing is one of the most commonly observed inter-firm contractual agreements.Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm and contract economics, we argue that the inclusion of a grant-back clause in licensing agreements emerges as a consequence of the licensor and licensee firms’ requirements to balance the need to protect their technological resources with the need to learn through internal and external processes. We argue that licensing
    agreements are increasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause (i) the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensor’s patent portfolio, and (ii) the higher the uncertainty of the licensed technology. In contrast, we conjecture decreasing likelihood of a grant-back clause, the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensee’s patent portfolio. Technological uncertainty is conjectured to positively moderate the results both when the licensed technology is part of the core technology of the licensee and the licensor. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 404 licensed technologies over the period 1984-2004. We employ a hierarchical nested decision model to account for the inclusion of a grant-back clause in a licensing contract nested in the decision about which technologies to license out. We find broad support for our theoretical
    arguments
    Licensing is one of the most commonly observed inter-firm contractual agreements.Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm and contract economics, we argue that the inclusion of a grant-back clause in licensing agreements emerges as a consequence of the licensor and licensee firms’ requirements to balance the need to protect their technological resources with the need to learn through internal and external processes. We argue that licensing
    agreements are increasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause (i) the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensor’s patent portfolio, and (ii) the higher the uncertainty of the licensed technology. In contrast, we conjecture decreasing likelihood of a grant-back clause, the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensee’s patent portfolio. Technological uncertainty is conjectured to positively moderate the results both when the licensed technology is part of the core technology of the licensee and the licensor. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 404 licensed technologies over the period 1984-2004. We employ a hierarchical nested decision model to account for the inclusion of a grant-back clause in a licensing contract nested in the decision about which technologies to license out. We find broad support for our theoretical
    arguments

    Conference

    ConferenceThe 35th DRUID Celebration Conference 2013: Innovation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship
    Number35
    LocationESADE Business School, Ramon Llull University
    CountrySpain
    CityBarcelona
    Period17/06/201319/06/2013
    OtherThe DRUID Society Conference 2013
    Internet address

    Keywords

      Cite this

      Laursen, K., Leone, M. I., Moreira, S., & Reichstein, T. (2013). Exploring the Boomerang Effect: The Role of Core Technologies and Uncertainty in Explaining the Use of the Grant-Back Clause in Technology Licensing. Paper presented at The 35th DRUID Celebration Conference 2013: Innovation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship, Barcelona, Spain.
      Laursen, Keld ; Leone, M. Isabella ; Moreira, Solon ; Reichstein, Toke. / Exploring the Boomerang Effect : The Role of Core Technologies and Uncertainty in Explaining the Use of the Grant-Back Clause in Technology Licensing. Paper presented at The 35th DRUID Celebration Conference 2013: Innovation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship, Barcelona, Spain.37 p.
      @conference{0d2c655ec2bf47dca15ecce298a1895c,
      title = "Exploring the Boomerang Effect: The Role of Core Technologies and Uncertainty in Explaining the Use of the Grant-Back Clause in Technology Licensing",
      abstract = "Licensing is one of the most commonly observed inter-firm contractual agreements.Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm and contract economics, we argue that the inclusion of a grant-back clause in licensing agreements emerges as a consequence of the licensor and licensee firms’ requirements to balance the need to protect their technological resources with the need to learn through internal and external processes. We argue that licensing agreements are increasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause (i) the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensor’s patent portfolio, and (ii) the higher the uncertainty of the licensed technology. In contrast, we conjecture decreasing likelihood of a grant-back clause, the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensee’s patent portfolio. Technological uncertainty is conjectured to positively moderate the results both when the licensed technology is part of the core technology of the licensee and the licensor. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 404 licensed technologies over the period 1984-2004. We employ a hierarchical nested decision model to account for the inclusion of a grant-back clause in a licensing contract nested in the decision about which technologies to license out. We find broad support for our theoretical arguments",
      keywords = "Grant-back Clause, Technology Licensing, Core Technology, Technological Uncertainty",
      author = "Keld Laursen and Leone, {M. Isabella} and Solon Moreira and Toke Reichstein",
      year = "2013",
      month = "2",
      day = "11",
      language = "English",
      note = "null ; Conference date: 17-06-2013 Through 19-06-2013",
      url = "http://druid8.sit.aau.dk/registrant/index/login/cid/13",

      }

      Exploring the Boomerang Effect : The Role of Core Technologies and Uncertainty in Explaining the Use of the Grant-Back Clause in Technology Licensing. / Laursen, Keld; Leone, M. Isabella; Moreira, Solon; Reichstein, Toke.

      2013. Paper presented at The 35th DRUID Celebration Conference 2013: Innovation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship, Barcelona, Spain.

      Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

      TY - CONF

      T1 - Exploring the Boomerang Effect

      T2 - The Role of Core Technologies and Uncertainty in Explaining the Use of the Grant-Back Clause in Technology Licensing

      AU - Laursen,Keld

      AU - Leone,M. Isabella

      AU - Moreira,Solon

      AU - Reichstein,Toke

      PY - 2013/2/11

      Y1 - 2013/2/11

      N2 - Licensing is one of the most commonly observed inter-firm contractual agreements.Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm and contract economics, we argue that the inclusion of a grant-back clause in licensing agreements emerges as a consequence of the licensor and licensee firms’ requirements to balance the need to protect their technological resources with the need to learn through internal and external processes. We argue that licensing agreements are increasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause (i) the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensor’s patent portfolio, and (ii) the higher the uncertainty of the licensed technology. In contrast, we conjecture decreasing likelihood of a grant-back clause, the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensee’s patent portfolio. Technological uncertainty is conjectured to positively moderate the results both when the licensed technology is part of the core technology of the licensee and the licensor. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 404 licensed technologies over the period 1984-2004. We employ a hierarchical nested decision model to account for the inclusion of a grant-back clause in a licensing contract nested in the decision about which technologies to license out. We find broad support for our theoretical arguments

      AB - Licensing is one of the most commonly observed inter-firm contractual agreements.Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm and contract economics, we argue that the inclusion of a grant-back clause in licensing agreements emerges as a consequence of the licensor and licensee firms’ requirements to balance the need to protect their technological resources with the need to learn through internal and external processes. We argue that licensing agreements are increasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause (i) the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensor’s patent portfolio, and (ii) the higher the uncertainty of the licensed technology. In contrast, we conjecture decreasing likelihood of a grant-back clause, the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensee’s patent portfolio. Technological uncertainty is conjectured to positively moderate the results both when the licensed technology is part of the core technology of the licensee and the licensor. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 404 licensed technologies over the period 1984-2004. We employ a hierarchical nested decision model to account for the inclusion of a grant-back clause in a licensing contract nested in the decision about which technologies to license out. We find broad support for our theoretical arguments

      KW - Grant-back Clause

      KW - Technology Licensing

      KW - Core Technology

      KW - Technological Uncertainty

      M3 - Paper

      ER -

      Laursen K, Leone MI, Moreira S, Reichstein T. Exploring the Boomerang Effect: The Role of Core Technologies and Uncertainty in Explaining the Use of the Grant-Back Clause in Technology Licensing. 2013. Paper presented at The 35th DRUID Celebration Conference 2013: Innovation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship, Barcelona, Spain.