Evidence Standards and Litigation: A Rent-seeking Game

Alice Guerra, Barbara Luppi, Francesco Parisi

    Research output: Working paperResearch

    Abstract

    In litigation models, the parties’ probability to succeed in a lawsuit hinge upon two main factors: the merits of the parties’ claims and their litigation efforts (Katz, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1989; Farmer and Pecorino, 1999). In this paper we extend this framework to consider an important procedural aspect of the legal system: the evidence standard. We recast the conventional rent-seeking model to consider how alternative evidence standards affect litigation choices. We analyze the interrelation between different evidence standards, the effectiveness of the parties’ efforts, and the merits of the case. We study how these factors jointly affect the parties’ litigation expenditures and the selection of cases brought to the courts. The evidence standard has different effects on different types of cases, reducing litigation for high-merit cases when standards are set low and increasing litigation for low-merit cases when standards are set high. This provides a valuable key for understanding the sorting effect of evidence standards and their role as a policy instrument in civil litigation.
    In litigation models, the parties’ probability to succeed in a lawsuit hinge upon two main factors: the merits of the parties’ claims and their litigation efforts (Katz, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1989; Farmer and Pecorino, 1999). In this paper we extend this framework to consider an important procedural aspect of the legal system: the evidence standard. We recast the conventional rent-seeking model to consider how alternative evidence standards affect litigation choices. We analyze the interrelation between different evidence standards, the effectiveness of the parties’ efforts, and the merits of the case. We study how these factors jointly affect the parties’ litigation expenditures and the selection of cases brought to the courts. The evidence standard has different effects on different types of cases, reducing litigation for high-merit cases when standards are set low and increasing litigation for low-merit cases when standards are set high. This provides a valuable key for understanding the sorting effect of evidence standards and their role as a policy instrument in civil litigation.
    LanguageEnglish
    Place of PublicationMinneapolis, MN
    PublisherUniversity of Minnesota Press
    Number of pages18
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2016
    SeriesMinnesota Legal Studies Research Paper
    Number16-18

    Keywords

    • Litigation
    • Evidence standard
    • Rent seeking

    Cite this

    Guerra, A., Luppi, B., & Parisi, F. (2016). Evidence Standards and Litigation: A Rent-seeking Game. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 16-18, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2780634
    Guerra, Alice ; Luppi, Barbara ; Parisi, Francesco. / Evidence Standards and Litigation : A Rent-seeking Game. Minneapolis, MN : University of Minnesota Press, 2016. (Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper; No. 16-18).
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    Guerra, A, Luppi, B & Parisi, F 2016 'Evidence Standards and Litigation: A Rent-seeking Game' University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2780634

    Evidence Standards and Litigation : A Rent-seeking Game. / Guerra, Alice; Luppi, Barbara; Parisi, Francesco.

    Minneapolis, MN : University of Minnesota Press, 2016.

    Research output: Working paperResearch

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    AB - In litigation models, the parties’ probability to succeed in a lawsuit hinge upon two main factors: the merits of the parties’ claims and their litigation efforts (Katz, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1989; Farmer and Pecorino, 1999). In this paper we extend this framework to consider an important procedural aspect of the legal system: the evidence standard. We recast the conventional rent-seeking model to consider how alternative evidence standards affect litigation choices. We analyze the interrelation between different evidence standards, the effectiveness of the parties’ efforts, and the merits of the case. We study how these factors jointly affect the parties’ litigation expenditures and the selection of cases brought to the courts. The evidence standard has different effects on different types of cases, reducing litigation for high-merit cases when standards are set low and increasing litigation for low-merit cases when standards are set high. This provides a valuable key for understanding the sorting effect of evidence standards and their role as a policy instrument in civil litigation.

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    Guerra A, Luppi B, Parisi F. Evidence Standards and Litigation: A Rent-seeking Game. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 2016. Available from, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2780634