Abstract
| Language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Organization Science |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Pages | 514-530 |
| ISSN | 1047-7039 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- Grant-back clause
- Technology licensing
- Core technology
- Appropriability
Cite this
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Evading the Boomerang Effect : Using the Grant-back Clause to Further Generative Appropriability from Technology Licensing Deals. / Laursen, Keld; Moreira, Solon; Reichstein, Toke; Leone, Maria Isabella.
In: Organization Science, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2017, p. 514-530.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Evading the Boomerang Effect
T2 - Organization Science
AU - Laursen,Keld
AU - Moreira,Solon
AU - Reichstein,Toke
AU - Leone,Maria Isabella
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - Technology licensing agreements potentially can create future appropriability problems. Drawing on the appropriability literature, we argue that the inclusion of a grant-back clause in technology licensing agreements is an attempt to balance the gains from and protection of the focal firms’ technologies. We hypothesize that the closer the licensed technology is to the licensor’s core patented technologies, the more likely the licensing agreement will include a grant-back clause, while the closer the licensed technology is to the licensee’s core patent portfolio, the less likely the agreement will include a grant-back clause. We hypothesize also that technological uncertainty is a positive moderator in the decision to include a grant-back clause, if the licensed technology is close to either the licensee’s or the licensor’s core technologies. We employ a hierarchical nested decision model to test the hypotheses on a sample of 397 licensed technologies. This method allows us to model the choice to include a grant-back clause as nested in the decision about which technologies to license out. We find broad support for our theoretical arguments.
AB - Technology licensing agreements potentially can create future appropriability problems. Drawing on the appropriability literature, we argue that the inclusion of a grant-back clause in technology licensing agreements is an attempt to balance the gains from and protection of the focal firms’ technologies. We hypothesize that the closer the licensed technology is to the licensor’s core patented technologies, the more likely the licensing agreement will include a grant-back clause, while the closer the licensed technology is to the licensee’s core patent portfolio, the less likely the agreement will include a grant-back clause. We hypothesize also that technological uncertainty is a positive moderator in the decision to include a grant-back clause, if the licensed technology is close to either the licensee’s or the licensor’s core technologies. We employ a hierarchical nested decision model to test the hypotheses on a sample of 397 licensed technologies. This method allows us to model the choice to include a grant-back clause as nested in the decision about which technologies to license out. We find broad support for our theoretical arguments.
KW - Grant-back clause
KW - Technology licensing
KW - Core technology
KW - Appropriability
KW - Grant-back clause
KW - Technology licensing
KW - Core technology
KW - Appropriability
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U2 - 10.1287/orsc.2017.1130
DO - 10.1287/orsc.2017.1130
M3 - Journal article
VL - 28
SP - 514
EP - 530
JO - Organization Science
JF - Organization Science
SN - 1047-7039
IS - 3
ER -