### Abstract

numerical method to compute this equilibrium and demonstrate by an example in which the social efficiency is lower than that induced by a similar queueing system that serves customers on a first-come first-serve (FCFS) basis.

Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Book of Abstracts : Abstracts of 15th European Meeting on Game Theory (Formerly Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory – SING15) |

Editors | Mitri Kitti |

Number of pages | 1 |

Place of Publication | Turku |

Publisher | University of Turku |

Publication date | 2019 |

Publication status | Published - 2019 |

### Cite this

*Book of Abstracts: Abstracts of 15th European Meeting on Game Theory (Formerly Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory – SING15)*Turku: University of Turku.

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*Book of Abstracts: Abstracts of 15th European Meeting on Game Theory (Formerly Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory – SING15).*University of Turku, Turku.

**Equilibrium Arrivals to a Queue under Last-come First-serve Preemptive-resume.** / Breinbjerg, Jesper; Platz, Trine Tornøe ; Østerdal, Lars Peter.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference abstract in proceedings › Research › peer-review

TY - ABST

T1 - Equilibrium Arrivals to a Queue under Last-come First-serve Preemptive-resume

AU - Breinbjerg, Jesper

AU - Platz, Trine Tornøe

AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - We consider a queueing environment where a finite number of customers independently choose when to arrive at a queueing system that opens at a specific time and serves customers on a last-come first-serve preemptive-resume (LCFSPR) basis. Each customer has a service time requirement that is identically and independently distributed, and customers want to complete service as early as possible while minimizing the time spent in the queue. We establish the existence of a symmetric (mixed) Nash equilibrium and show that there is at most one symmetric equilibrium. We provide anumerical method to compute this equilibrium and demonstrate by an example in which the social efficiency is lower than that induced by a similar queueing system that serves customers on a first-come first-serve (FCFS) basis.

AB - We consider a queueing environment where a finite number of customers independently choose when to arrive at a queueing system that opens at a specific time and serves customers on a last-come first-serve preemptive-resume (LCFSPR) basis. Each customer has a service time requirement that is identically and independently distributed, and customers want to complete service as early as possible while minimizing the time spent in the queue. We establish the existence of a symmetric (mixed) Nash equilibrium and show that there is at most one symmetric equilibrium. We provide anumerical method to compute this equilibrium and demonstrate by an example in which the social efficiency is lower than that induced by a similar queueing system that serves customers on a first-come first-serve (FCFS) basis.

M3 - Conference abstract in proceedings

BT - Book of Abstracts

A2 - Kitti, Mitri

PB - University of Turku

CY - Turku

ER -