Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

Nicolae Garleanu, Lasse Heje Pedersen

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform after fees, and the net performance of the average manager depends on the number of "noise allocators." Small investors should be passive, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Finance
Volume73
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)1663-1712
Number of pages50
ISSN0022-1082
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Keywords

  • Asset management
  • Investment
  • Information
  • Search
  • Efficiency
  • Asset pricing
  • Liquidity

Cite this

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Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management. / Garleanu, Nicolae; Pedersen, Lasse Heje.

In: Journal of Finance, Vol. 73, No. 4, 2018, p. 1663-1712.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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