Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Comment on “Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability” by Urs Schweizer
Comment on “Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability” by Urs Schweizer
LanguageEnglish
JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Volume173
Issue number1
Pages77-83
Number of pages7
ISSN0932-4569
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

Cite this

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title = "Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability",
abstract = "Comment on “Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability” by Urs Schweizer",
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publisher = "Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG",
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Efficient Compensation : Lessons from Civil Liability. / Lando, Henrik.

In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 173, No. 1, 2017, p. 77-83.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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