The title of this paper may appeal to both economists of organization and ton resource-based scholars, although they are likely to entertain divergent expectations about its contents. For those mainly interested in economic organization, expectations probably will be directed toward a question such as, “How do we secure incentives to invest in accumulating assets with a given and well-known rent earning capacity?”. The interesting aspects of this question would depend on the assumed information cost constraints on contracting for such an investment. On the other hand, for hose economists and management scholars mainly interested in resource-based perspectives on firms, the title probably would be interpreted as a label covering discussions of issues such as “How may rent-earning assets be accumulated as for example, joint-product of the activities taking place within the firms?”, “How may differences in historic circumstances and accumulation capacity between firm explain the rents generated from those assets?” and “How may such assets best be explored?”.
|Place of Publication||Copenhagen|
|Publisher||Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi, Handelshøjskolen i København|
|Number of pages||30|
|Publication status||Published - Feb 1998|
|Series||Working Paper / Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy. Copenhagen Business School|
Foss, K. (1998). Economic Organization and the Accumulation of Rent-earning Assets. Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi, Handelshøjskolen i København. Working Paper / Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy. Copenhagen Business School, No. 1998-2