Dynamic Capital Structure with Callable Debt and Debt Renegotiations

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm’s capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders’ own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders’ bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.
We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm’s capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders’ own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders’ bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.
LanguageEnglish
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume29
Pages644-661
Number of pages18
ISSN0929-1199
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2014

Keywords

    Cite this

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    abstract = "We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm’s capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders’ own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders’ bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.",
    keywords = "Dynamic capital structure, Violation of absolute priority, Debt restructuring",
    author = "Christensen, {Peter Ove} and Flor, {Christian Riis} and David Lando and Kristian Miltersen",
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    Dynamic Capital Structure with Callable Debt and Debt Renegotiations. / Christensen, Peter Ove; Flor, Christian Riis; Lando, David; Miltersen, Kristian.

    In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 29, 12.2014, p. 644-661.

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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