Do Boards in New Ventures Monitor Management: The Impact of New Venture Boards on CEO Pay

Ruidong Zhu, Jakob Arnoldi, Miriam Nicole Flickinger, Jacek Piosik

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference abstract in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The existing literature holds that new venture boards greatly influence firm performance through frequent involvement in daily operations. This literature highlights the service function of the new venture board while neglecting its monitoring function. Based on the board monitoring literature and the managerial power theory, we shed light on how new venture boards monitor CEO pay and how the monitoring is affected by the power balance between boards and CEOs. Drawing on 121,031 firm-year observations of Danish new ventures between 2015 and 2020, we observe significant board's monitoring of the CEO pay. We also provide evidence that the CEO duality weakens the new venture board monitoring. Our findings suggest the need to consider new venture boards' monitoring function from the power perspective.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Eighty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management
EditorsSonia Taneja
Number of pages1
Place of PublicationValhalla, NY
PublisherAcademy of Management
Publication date2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024
EventThe Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2024: Innovating for the Future: Policy, Purpose, and Organizations - Chicago, United States
Duration: 9 Aug 202413 Aug 2024
Conference number: 84
https://aom2024.eventscribe.net/

Conference

ConferenceThe Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2024
Number84
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityChicago
Period09/08/202413/08/2024
Internet address
SeriesAcademy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings
ISSN0065-0668

Cite this