Abstract
The existing literature holds that new venture boards greatly influence firm performance through frequent involvement in daily operations. This literature highlights the service function of the new venture board while neglecting its monitoring function. Based on the board monitoring literature and the managerial power theory, we shed light on how new venture boards monitor CEO pay and how the monitoring is affected by the power balance between boards and CEOs. Drawing on 121,031 firm-year observations of Danish new ventures between 2015 and 2020, we observe significant board's monitoring of the CEO pay. We also provide evidence that the CEO duality weakens the new venture board monitoring. Our findings suggest the need to consider new venture boards' monitoring function from the power perspective.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Eighty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management |
Editors | Sonia Taneja |
Number of pages | 1 |
Place of Publication | Valhalla, NY |
Publisher | Academy of Management |
Publication date | 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Event | The Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2024: Innovating for the Future: Policy, Purpose, and Organizations - Chicago, United States Duration: 9 Aug 2024 → 13 Aug 2024 Conference number: 84 https://aom2024.eventscribe.net/ |
Conference
Conference | The Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2024 |
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Number | 84 |
Country/Territory | United States |
City | Chicago |
Period | 09/08/2024 → 13/08/2024 |
Internet address |
Series | Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings |
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ISSN | 0065-0668 |