Disentangling Disproportionality

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    The literature on deviations from one share-one vote seems to ignore that a difference between influence and investment, i.e., disproportionality, may exist without control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares. I propose a method to disentangle disproportionality and argue for its relevance. The consequences are documented on a testing data set.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume117
    Issue number3
    Pages (from-to)743-745
    ISSN0165-1765
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012

    Cite this

    Poulsen, Thomas. / Disentangling Disproportionality. In: Economics Letters. 2012 ; Vol. 117, No. 3. pp. 743-745.
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    abstract = "The literature on deviations from one share-one vote seems to ignore that a difference between influence and investment, i.e., disproportionality, may exist without control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares. I propose a method to disentangle disproportionality and argue for its relevance. The consequences are documented on a testing data set.",
    keywords = "Ownership structure, Disproportionality, Voting power, Firm value",
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    Disentangling Disproportionality. / Poulsen, Thomas.

    In: Economics Letters, Vol. 117, No. 3, 2012, p. 743-745.

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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    AB - The literature on deviations from one share-one vote seems to ignore that a difference between influence and investment, i.e., disproportionality, may exist without control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares. I propose a method to disentangle disproportionality and argue for its relevance. The consequences are documented on a testing data set.

    KW - Ownership structure

    KW - Disproportionality

    KW - Voting power

    KW - Firm value

    U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.036

    DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.036

    M3 - Journal article

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    JO - Economics Letters

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