Discontinuous Nash Equilibria in a Two-stage Linear-quadratic Dynamic Game with Linear Constraints

Rajani Singh, Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review


In this note, we study a simple example of a two-stage linear-quadratic dynamic game in which the presence of simple linear state dependent constraints results in nonexistence of continuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria and the existence of continuum of discontinuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria. The example is not an abstract model-it has obvious applications in economics of resource extraction.
Original languageEnglish
Article number8556031
JournalIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Issue number7
Pages (from-to)3074-3079
Number of pages6
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019
Externally publishedYes


  • Games
  • Silicon
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Economics
  • Optimization
  • Mathematical model
  • Business

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