Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Characterization

Jens Leth Hougaard, Lars Peter Østerdal

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The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245–275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178–201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)469-479
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes


  • Serial cost sharing
  • Cost allocation
  • Axiomatic characterization

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