Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening

Diderik Lund, Tore Nilssen

Research output: Working paperResearch

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We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenomenon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are profitably detracted from the candidate pooling contract.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationFrederiksberg
PublisherDepartment of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Number of pages22
Publication statusPublished - 2003
Externally publishedYes
SeriesWorking Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School

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