Control Dilution and Distribution of Ownership

Morten Bennedsen, Mogens Fosgerau, Daniel Wolfenzon

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Abstract

We investigate the patterns of ultimate distribution of ownership in a sample of small closely held corporations. Motivated by recent corporate governance theories we define control dilution as the absenc of a single dominating shareholder. Most firms have one or two ultimate owners implying that control is very concentrated. However, we find strong evidence for control dilution in firms with multiple owners and we proceed to analyze three potential explanations: a general strategic motive, a coalition formation argument and the presence of family ownership. We find the strongest evidence for a general strategic motive and we clearly reject that the observed control dilution is due to family ownership. Finally, we show that the probability of control dilution increases with manager ownership and number of owners, but decreases with the age of the firm and with the presence of family ownership.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationFrederiksberg
PublisherDepartment of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Number of pages34
Publication statusPublished - 2000
SeriesWorking Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Number16-2000

Cite this

Bennedsen, M., Fosgerau, M., & Wolfenzon, D. (2000). Control Dilution and Distribution of Ownership. Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School. Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, No. 16-2000