Abstract
Using Rogoff's, 1985 model, we determine how inflation averse a central banker should be, given the level of volatility and projected output gap in the economy. We confirm a strong degree of conservatism, almost twice what society would have chosen. But, for a range of developing countries and the OECD, economies that systematically experience higher levels of output volatility would do best to hire a central banker who is more inflation averse than society, but less so than in stable developed economies. Thus, while a conservative central banker remains desirable, the trade‐off is with output volatility rather than with the output gap itself.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Scottish Journal of Political Economy |
Volume | 65 |
Issue number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 97-104 |
Number of pages | 8 |
ISSN | 0036-9292 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Feb 2018 |