Competition in Soccer Leagues

Bodil Olai Hansen, Mich Tvede

Research output: Working paperResearch

3 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationFrederiksberg
PublisherDepartment of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - 2007
SeriesWorking Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Number10-2007

Keywords

  • Competition between sports clubs
  • Dimension of quality of players
  • Equilibrium in pure strategies
  • Equilibrium in mixed strategies

Cite this

Olai Hansen, B., & Tvede, M. (2007). Competition in Soccer Leagues. Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School. Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, No. 10-2007