CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange

Robert Neumann, Torben Voetmann

Research output: Working paperResearch

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between performance and CEO turnovers using a sample of 81 turnovers and 81 matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We find that poor performance increases the probability of management replacements and that forced layoffs are value-increasing events while voluntary resignations are value-decreasing events. Institutional investors as active monitors, or part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the analysis of CEO turnovers. If institutional investors have any influence on CEO turnovers, then it is not revealed in our data. But, the results suggest that institutional investors' equity holdings tend to protect managers from replacement.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationFrederiksberg
PublisherInstitut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School
Number of pages33
ISBN (Print)8790705254
Publication statusPublished - 1999
SeriesWorking Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School
Number1999-10
ISSN0903-0352

Keywords

  • CEO turnovers
  • Corporate governance
  • Ownership structure

Cite this

Neumann, R., & Voetmann, T. (1999). CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Frederiksberg: Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School. Working Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School, No. 1999-10
Neumann, Robert ; Voetmann, Torben. / CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance : Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Frederiksberg : Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, 1999. (Working Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School; No. 1999-10).
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Neumann, R & Voetmann, T 1999 'CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange' Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg.

CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance : Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. / Neumann, Robert; Voetmann, Torben.

Frederiksberg : Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, 1999.

Research output: Working paperResearch

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Neumann R, Voetmann T. CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Frederiksberg: Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School. 1999.