Building a Trust Machine: Fidelity Mechanisms in Organizations

This article investigates how intra-organizational mechanisms support the production of institutional trust in complex social systems. We focus on how trustees organize the reproduction of trust objects with regularity and reliability, regardless of the organizational member responsible; in short—<i>fidelity</i>. We theorize the importance of fidelity mechanisms, specifying practices of <i>recognition</i> around trust objects, the <i>selection</i> of who is included in the organization, and ongoing <i>socialization</i> within the organization. All three affirm the regular and impersonal reproduction of trust objects. To substantiate these theoretical claims, we draw on both a mixed-methods research design and a unique hand-coded dataset from archival materials on judges at the German Federal Fiscal Court (BFH) from 1929 onwards, including verdicts from 1970 to 2018. We show that the BFH, as a trustee, has developed fidelity mechanisms to mediate external challenges to its legal principles, such as financial innovations that demand the development or alteration of concepts. We link BFH verdicts (the trust object) on such a new legal concept (i.e. economic ownership) to precedents, as well as tracing the career backgrounds and in situ practices of those making these opinions for the legal profession (the trustor). We add to the literature on institution-based trust by theorizing intra-organizational mechanisms that foster a trustee’s ability to enhance its trustworthiness through the issuance of reciprocally confirming trust objects, thereby supporting the institutional reproduction of complex social systems.