Breaking Through: The IMO Decision-Making Process: The Decision-making Process in the IMO: a Participating Delegate's Point of View

This dissertation is an analysis of decision-making at the International Maritime Organization
(the IMO). The IMO is a sectorial international organisation that regulates shipping1 and has both state and non-state participants. The IMO can adopt binding regulations that can be introduced by a majority of states against the wishes of others, with the effect that these regulations can then be enforced even against ships of the dissenting nations, and against ships of non-parties.
Conventional wisdom ascribes influence in international organisations to powerful states or large transnational corporations that have "captured" the organisation. Many observers assume that outcomes reflect the preferences of delegations that protect and promote their interests. This dissertation determines by close observation how results that do not conform to the preferences of any delegation can be reached by sometimes path dependent processes that to a high degree are determined by the actions or indecision of the chair2.
Using multiple methods of participant observation, interviews and document analysis, the dissertation argues from a constructivist perspective, that outcomes are determined by decisions of the chair and influenced by path dependent processes of negotiations and the culture of the organisation, including unintentional and unforeseen effects of the actions of participants.
Although the IMO claims – as do many other international organisations – to work by consensus, decisions are shown to be in reality taken by vote. However, the chair has the power to select the timing, and the alternatives presented, and the culture of the IMO implies that no decision is likely to be made, even if a majority supports a certain solution, unless it is clear that the alternative is an undesirable status quo or will leave the rulemaking to another institution . The single most influential actor in controversial issues is the chair. Actual results will therefore be heavily dependent on the capacities and competences of the person elected as chair. The chair can choose which options are presented and when a decision is to be made, but cannot force an unpopular decision through, although in some cases the chair can prevent even widely acceptable outcomes.
The slow global progress in the IMO towards concrete decisions to protect the environment is shown not to be surprising considering the central concern of a majority of states that any regulation of shipping should not disrupt trade. Although protecting shipping from the effects of environmental regulation is a priority for these members of IMO, the process has its own dynamic that ensures that decisions of some sort will be made, and that negotiations in the IMO can break though the stalemates that impede many other international negotiations on environmental issue, such as those in the UNFCCC.
The conclusions are valid for contentious and salient issues, such as those examined. Other decisions where differences are less politically sensitive may have other dynamics.