This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only for larger rms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A suffciently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.
| Original language | English |
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| Place of Publication | Frederiksberg |
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| Publisher | Copenhagen Business School, CBS |
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| Pages | 37 |
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| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
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| Series | Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School |
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| Number | 1-2016 |
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