Abstract
We characterize optimal R&D strategies in a model where an incumbent and a startup with no possibility to enter the market choose both investment level and radicalness of their R&D projects. The incumbent commercializes the most valuable project, and, where necessary, acquires the startup. The startup has two locally optimal strategies: A “high quality” and a “low cost” strategy where it aims for having the most valuable and the only successful R&D project, respectively. The struggle for rents inside the innovation system results in an inefficient portfolio of projects compared to the R&D choices that a monopolist would make.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 107024 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Volume | 234 |
Number of pages | 13 |
ISSN | 0167-2681 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Published online: 19 April 2025.Keywords
- R&D competition
- Startup
- Technology acquisition
- Markets for technology
- Game theory