Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

    Research output: Working paperResearch

    Abstract

    It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementaryboth in the sense that when more decisions are delegated toa lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be madeof incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentivesshould be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzedwithin a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisionsto be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent,and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal(i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within thisframework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarilycomplementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized whenincentives are introduced.
    It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementaryboth in the sense that when more decisions are delegated toa lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be madeof incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentivesshould be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzedwithin a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisionsto be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent,and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal(i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within thisframework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarilycomplementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized whenincentives are introduced.
    LanguageEnglish
    Place of PublicationKøbenhavn
    Number of pages21
    StatePublished - 2004

    Keywords

      Cite this

      @techreport{60ede9e0c02111db9769000ea68e967b,
      title = "Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?",
      abstract = "It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementaryboth in the sense that when more decisions are delegated toa lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be madeof incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentivesshould be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzedwithin a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisionsto be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent,and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal(i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within thisframework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarilycomplementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized whenincentives are introduced.",
      keywords = "Bel{\o}nningssystemer, Incitamentsafl{\o}nning, Agentteori, Uddelegering, Beslutningsteori",
      author = "Henrik Lando",
      year = "2004",
      language = "English",
      type = "WorkingPaper",

      }

      Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ? / Lando, Henrik.

      København, 2004.

      Research output: Working paperResearch

      TY - UNPB

      T1 - Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

      AU - Lando,Henrik

      PY - 2004

      Y1 - 2004

      N2 - It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementaryboth in the sense that when more decisions are delegated toa lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be madeof incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentivesshould be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzedwithin a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisionsto be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent,and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal(i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within thisframework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarilycomplementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized whenincentives are introduced.

      AB - It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementaryboth in the sense that when more decisions are delegated toa lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be madeof incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentivesshould be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzedwithin a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisionsto be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent,and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal(i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within thisframework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarilycomplementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized whenincentives are introduced.

      KW - Belønningssystemer

      KW - Incitamentsaflønning

      KW - Agentteori

      KW - Uddelegering

      KW - Beslutningsteori

      M3 - Working paper

      BT - Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

      CY - København

      ER -