Are Ascriptions of Intentionality to the Brain Incoherent? The Mereological Argument Against Cognitive Neuroscience

The ascriptions of ‘agency’ or ‘intentionality’ to the brain has long been regarded with suspicion from social scientists and philosophers. In the talk, I will argue that this suspicion is perfectly legitimate and that the standard response from the defenders of cognitive neuroscience is illegitimate – namely the response that such talk is technical (e.g. Ullman 1991), merely ‘metaphorical’(e.g. Blakemore 1990) or a flaw of ordinary language (e.g. Churchland&Churchland 1998).
In specific, I will discuss and present the – admittedly tentative – argument that the ascription of intentionality to the brain are conceptually incoherent because it commits a mereological fallacy (Bennett&Hacker 2001, 2007).