Are Ascriptions of Intentionality to the Brain Incoherent? The Mereological Argument Against Cognitive Neuroscience

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    The ascriptions of ‘agency’ or ‘intentionality’ to the brain has long been regarded with suspicion from social scientists and philosophers. In the talk, I will argue that this suspicion is perfectly legitimate and that the standard response from the defenders of cognitive neuroscience is illegitimate – namely the response that such talk is technical (e.g. Ullman 1991), merely ‘metaphorical’(e.g. Blakemore 1990) or a flaw of ordinary language (e.g. Churchland&Churchland 1998).
    In specific, I will discuss and present the – admittedly tentative – argument that the ascription of intentionality to the brain are conceptually incoherent because it commits a mereological fallacy (Bennett&Hacker 2001, 2007).
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication date2012
    Publication statusPublished - 2012
    EventSeminar in Cognitive Semiotics - Lund, Sweden
    Duration: 23 Feb 201223 Feb 2012


    SeminarSeminar in Cognitive Semiotics
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