Abusive Transfer Pricing and Economic Activity

Søren Bo Nielsen, Dirk Schindler , Guttorm Schjelderup

Research output: Working paperResearch

Abstract

This paper investigates how concealment costs of transfer pricing and the probability of detection affect transfer pricing and firm behavior. We find that transfer pricing in intermediate production factors does not affect real activity of a multinational firm if the firm’s concealment effort as well as the probability of being audited by tax authorities are conditioned on the amount of shifted profits. If tax authorities rely on the standard OECD arm’s-length principle instead by reacting to a deviation of the transfer price from the market price, the multinational will for tax reasons adjust its production structure. A policy implication of the paper is that it should be preferable to condition audits on the amount of income shifted rather than on the distortion of the transfer price proper. Another policy finding is that improving the quality of tax law might be superior to higher detection effort. The former reduces profit shifting and concealment effort, whereas the latter leads to more wasteful use of resources on concealment and has an ambiguous effect on profits shifted.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationBergen
PublisherNorges Handelshøyskole
Number of pages20
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
SeriesNorges Handelshoeyskole. Institutt for Foretaksoekonomi. Discussion Paper
Number2014/21
ISSN1500-4066

Bibliographical note

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Nielsen, S. B., Schindler , D., & Schjelderup, G. (2014). Abusive Transfer Pricing and Economic Activity. Bergen: Norges Handelshøyskole. Norges Handelshoeyskole. Institutt for Foretaksoekonomi. Discussion Paper, No. 2014/21 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2451055
Nielsen, Søren Bo ; Schindler , Dirk ; Schjelderup, Guttorm. / Abusive Transfer Pricing and Economic Activity. Bergen : Norges Handelshøyskole, 2014. (Norges Handelshoeyskole. Institutt for Foretaksoekonomi. Discussion Paper; No. 2014/21).
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Nielsen, SB, Schindler , D & Schjelderup, G 2014 'Abusive Transfer Pricing and Economic Activity' Norges Handelshøyskole, Bergen. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2451055

Abusive Transfer Pricing and Economic Activity. / Nielsen, Søren Bo; Schindler , Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm.

Bergen : Norges Handelshøyskole, 2014.

Research output: Working paperResearch

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Nielsen SB, Schindler D, Schjelderup G. Abusive Transfer Pricing and Economic Activity. Bergen: Norges Handelshøyskole. 2014. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2451055