### Abstract

Original language | English |
---|---|

Journal | Finance and Stochastics |

Volume | 18 |

Issue number | 3 |

Pages (from-to) | 545-592 |

ISSN | 0949-2984 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 2014 |

### Cite this

*Finance and Stochastics*,

*18*(3), 545-592. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-014-0234-y

}

*Finance and Stochastics*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 545-592. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-014-0234-y

**A Theory of Markovian Time-inconsistent Stochastic Control in Discrete Time.** / Björk, Tomas; Murgoci, Agatha.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Theory of Markovian Time-inconsistent Stochastic Control in Discrete Time

AU - Björk, Tomas

AU - Murgoci, Agatha

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - We develop a theory for a general class of discrete-time stochastic control problems that, in various ways, are time-inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We attack these problems by viewing them within a game theoretic framework, and we look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. For a general controlled Markov process and a fairly general objective functional, we derive an extension of the standard Bellman equation, in the form of a system of nonlinear equations, for the determination of the equilibrium strategy as well as the equilibrium value function. Most known examples of time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in the literature are easily seen to be special cases of the present theory. We also prove that for every time-inconsistent problem, there exists an associated time-consistent problem such that the optimal control and the optimal value function for the consistent problem coincide with the equilibrium control and value function, respectively for the time-inconsistent problem. To exemplify the theory, we study some concrete examples, such as hyperbolic discounting and mean–variance control.

AB - We develop a theory for a general class of discrete-time stochastic control problems that, in various ways, are time-inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We attack these problems by viewing them within a game theoretic framework, and we look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. For a general controlled Markov process and a fairly general objective functional, we derive an extension of the standard Bellman equation, in the form of a system of nonlinear equations, for the determination of the equilibrium strategy as well as the equilibrium value function. Most known examples of time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in the literature are easily seen to be special cases of the present theory. We also prove that for every time-inconsistent problem, there exists an associated time-consistent problem such that the optimal control and the optimal value function for the consistent problem coincide with the equilibrium control and value function, respectively for the time-inconsistent problem. To exemplify the theory, we study some concrete examples, such as hyperbolic discounting and mean–variance control.

KW - Time consistency

KW - Time inconsistency

KW - Time-inconsistent control

KW - Dynamic programming

KW - Stochastic control

KW - Bellman equation

KW - Hyperbolic discounting

KW - Mean–variance

U2 - 10.1007/s00780-014-0234-y

DO - 10.1007/s00780-014-0234-y

M3 - Journal article

VL - 18

SP - 545

EP - 592

JO - Finance and Stochastics

JF - Finance and Stochastics

SN - 0949-2984

IS - 3

ER -