A Question of Values(s)

Political Connectedness and Executive Compensation in Public Sector Organizations

Renate Meyer, Markus Höllerer, Stephan Leixnering

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

While the de-politicization of public sector management was a core objective of past reform initiatives, more recent debates urge the state to act as a strong principal when it comes to public sector unity and policy coherence – and consequently make a case for reinvigorating links between the political and managerial sphere. Using data from Austrian public sector organizations, we test and confirm the causal relationship of political connectedness of board members and executive compensation. Differentiating between value-based and interest-based in-groups, we suggest that only value-based political connectedness has the potential to restore patronage as a control instrument and governance tool. Self-interested and reward-driven patronage, on the other hand, indicated by a strong association of political connectedness and executive pay, refers to the type of politicization that previous public sector reforms promised to abolish.
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Public Management Journal
Volume21
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)477-500
Number of pages24
ISSN1096-7494
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Bibliographical note

Published online 29-10-2015

Cite this

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A Question of Values(s) : Political Connectedness and Executive Compensation in Public Sector Organizations. / Meyer, Renate; Höllerer, Markus; Leixnering, Stephan.

In: International Public Management Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2018, p. 477-500.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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AU - Leixnering, Stephan

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