A Political Theory of the Corporation: Refocusing the Degrowth Diagnosis of Corporate Growth Impetus and Shareholder Power

This paper challenges the degrowth movement’s diagnosis of corporations
as naturally growth-centric and undemocratic following the dominating
voting power of majority shareholders. The author argues that this view
stems from a neoliberal (mis)conceptualization of the corporation as a
private entity and misrecognises shareholders as executive owners of
corporations limited by shares. Drawing upon intellectual histories of
the corporation, the author suggests that the problems attributed
corporations by the degrowth movement are rooted not in shareholder
ownership in itself, but from a general misconceptualisation of the
corporation, leading to problematic regulation and governance. The
author proposes a political re-conceptualization of the corporation,
recognising it as a separate legal person constituted with its own
interests, distinct from its shareholders. This perspective reveals
that shareholders should not be understood as owners of corporations,
lacking direct control over, responsibility for and the management of
corporate assets or operations. The paper contends that the growth
imperative and shareholder primacy of corporations arise not from
stock-ownership in itself, but from misrecognising shareholders as
rights-bearing owners of the corporation, which naturalises governance
that equate corporate interests with shareholder interests. The author
advocates for a revaluation of corporate governance, suggesting that
more democratic and growth-agnostic corporate models might be possible
if recognising the separate legal person that is the corporate form.
The paper concludes by encouraging the degrowth literature to engage
with this alternative conceptualisation of the corporate ontology to
foster a political critique that could pave the way for transformative
changes in corporate governance.