Abstract
Designing utility regulation involves trade-offs between different goals of contract design. Prioritising one objective may come at the cost of assigning a lower priority to another objective. This study compares four regulatory frameworks in terms of how they each prioritise different goals of contract design. While revenue-cap regulation can be said to minimise transaction costs, it also assigns a lower priority to coordination of production. Conversely, the frameworks that explicitly incorporate stakeholder engagement or negotiation prioritise coordination of production while assigning a lower priority to minimisation of transaction costs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 101161 |
| Journal | Utilities Policy |
| Volume | 69 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| ISSN | 0957-1787 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Published online: 21 January 2021.Keywords
- Incentive regulation
- Customer engagement
- Contract design
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