The Long Shadow of War: Institutions, Economy, and Reconstruction in Syria

Abstract

This thesis examines how the Syrian civil war, beginning in 2011, reshaped the country’s institutional and economic foundations and redefined the prospects for peacebuilding and reconstruction. Rather than viewing the war as simply destructive, the study illustrates how it has actively reorganized power, legitimacy, and governance in Syria. Through a qualitative analysis combining interviews with regional experts and critical examination of policy documents, reports, and macroeconomic data, the thesis explores how violence, exclusion, and informal structures have replaced formal state institutions, leaving behind a fragmented and deeply doubtful society.The findings demonstrate that the civil war resulted in the emergence of new systems of control, often driven by survival, oppression, and elite interests. Institutions were weakened and corrupted, while local and foreign actors filled the vacuum with alternative forms of authority. The economic structure became increasingly informal, exploitative, and dependent on favoritism or loyalty, particularly as corruption, sanctions, and displacement further weakened formal coordination mechanisms. In this context, the Syrian state failed to function as a legitimate actor, and legitimacy itself became local, conditional, and challenged.The study critically engages with key theoretical perspectives to understand this significant transformation. While frameworks by Keen (2012), Collier (2007), Paris (2004), and Lijphart (1969) offer valuable insights into conflict economies, institutional fragility, and power-sharing, they struggle to fully capture the depth of Syria’s fragmentation, the blurring between state and non-state actors, and the strategic role of exclusion. Syria’s experience suggests that recovery cannot be reduced by institutional design or economic growth, but requires confronting the deep mistrust, identity divisions, and power imbalances that the war led to.The thesis concludes that peacebuilding in Syria must be locally grounded, politically inclusive, and socially reparative. Elite agreements and top-down reconstruction efforts risk reproducing the very inequalities that fueled the conflict. Thus, the sustainable recovery demands both institutional rebuilding and the creation of a new political structure that offers citizens reliable participation, protection, and economic dignity. In Syria, political legitimacy and economic recovery are not separate goals – they are inseparable foundations for any future peace.