The main purpose with this paper is to find and examine the theoretical and empirical reasons for why and if buyout funds are able to create operating performance, which outperforms the more traditionally led companies in the period 1995-‐2005. The theoretical part of this paper, examines the buyouts from an agency point of view. In theory there should be evidence that states that due to the change in corporate governance and incentive structures, a company that has experienced a buyout will perform better than it used to. These improvements are caused by the frequent use of managerial incentives, high use of debt and a very active ownership. To back up the conclusions found in the theory, an empirical study of 39 Danish companies have been conducted. Through an accounting analysis point of view, the operating development and performance, pre-‐buyout vs. post-‐buyout, is analyzed. In difference from prior international studies, this paper shows that the buyout funds have not been able to increase profitability or efficiency more than companies in their peer group. This paper also shows that a lot of the companies are more focused on growth rather than on reductions and efficiency. This could be because the buyout funds are more focused on creating a company that will be a strong player on the market in the future. In summary the Danish buyout market shows no empirical evidence to support the theoretical conclusions of that the buyout funds and their organizational form is superior to more traditional organizational form. Possible because that firms are led more professional today, which makes it more difficult for a PE-‐fund to find a company with operational possibilities.
|Uddannelser||Cand.merc.fir Finansiering og Regnskab, (Kandidatuddannelse) Afsluttende afhandling|